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Reflections on Holding and Dictum
Kent Greenawalt

The aim of these reflections, which adopt the perspectives of ordinary
judges and lawyers, is to try to help clarify what is uncontroversial about the
distinction between holding and dictum, to explain what is troublesome
about it, to provide-in fairly sketchy form-a way of understanding the
authority of various legal formulations that do not fit indisputably or wholly
comfortably in the category of holding or that of dictum, and to suggest a
conceptual vocabulary for expressing the practical realities I consider.
In the autumn of 1986, I taught a course in Legal Method for beginning
students at Columbia Law School. During the term, the class read cases
from Jones, Kernochan, and Murphy's Legal Method' that relied, at least
ostensibly, on the distinction between holding and dictum. Because I had
some reservations about the casebook commentary, I spent part of one class
lecturing on the distinction. After the students responded with almost total
confusion, I decided to put my ideas in writing for class distribution. I
sought to set out how holding and dictum operate and how they may be
conceived by judges and lawyers who employ the terms in practice, without
burdening what I said with extensive references to competing views or with
accounts of how modern skepticism about the determinacy of law might
affect one's perspectives on holding and dictum.2
I. The Basic Nature of the Distinction and the Reasons Underlying It
At its essential core the distinction between holding and dictum concerns
judicial practice. The distinction is part of a system in which courts are
"bound" to follow precedents. Very roughly, what that means in the
American system of law is that the same court that decided an earlier case,
as well as courts under that court in the same jurisdiction, are supposed to
follow what the first case establishes, unless what the first case establishes is
so wrongheaded that it is appropriately overruled.
Without elaborating a theory of overruling, let it suffice to say that under
our doctrine of precedent, later courts will follow what a first case
establishes even when they are not persuaded that what it establishes would
Kent Greenawalt is Cardozo Professor of Jurisprudence, Columbia University School of Law.
1. Harry W. Jones, John M. Kernochan & Arthur W. Murphy, Legal Method: Cases and
Text Materials (Mineola, N.Y., 1980).
2. The present version retains the purpose and form of the original effort. Although I
believe that both the soundness and significance of my analysis could be defended
against radical challenges to traditional ideas about legal reasoning, I offer no such
defense in this essay.
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be the best approach if the issue were presented to them anew. The later
judges may not be persuaded either because they have definite opinions
that the first case was "wrong," though not seriously wrong, or because they
do not pause to decide whether the first case established what it should have
established. I take the "force of precedent" as a given, without trying to
assess either just how great that force is or the reasons that underlie the
doctrine of precedent.
The distinction between holding and dictum concerns what the first case
establishes, as opposed to what its opinion may say that is not established. My
focus on situations in which a single precedent case is of great importance
oversimplifies the actual work of courts. In many legal settings courts
attempt to synthesize the determinations of a substantial number of cases,
so that what any single case establishes may not seem critical. In some
situations, however, it is the significance of a central preceding case that is
of overriding importance, and even in other situations, what a particular
case establishes can matter.
I make the critical assumption that for judges in the same court that
decided the first case, the distinction between holding and dictum is
genuinely important, or, to be a little more precise, the judges' assignment
of weight to elements in the earlier case depends on differences that the
conceptual distinction between holding and dictum is designed to reflect.
The terminology of "holding" and "dictum" is not merely, or even mainly,
a set of terms that misportrays reality and conceals the true bases on which
later courts reach decisions. I certainly do not wish to say that never
happens. No doubtjudges with some frequency say they are constrained to
follow earlier results when they really decide for other reasons, and no
doubt their expression, and even their own sense, of what earlier cases hold
is often determined by a predisposition to decide in a particular way. But
despite all this, in many circumstances courts really do feel constrained to
follow their own earlier decisions; and in all probability were there not this
substantial core of constraint, the concealments and one-sided formulations
of earlier precedents would cease to have much significance.
When a court regards itslf as constrained by its own earlier precedent
and tries to figure out what .aspects of the earlier case to treat as fully
authoritative, it seeks to determine what it should now do in respect to the
earlier case. If it decides that one aspect of that case is holding and another
dictum, it most certainly is not engaging in a prediction; it is determining
the appropriate latitude for deference to "established case law" and the
appropriate latitude for judgment based on other criteria.
The position of a lower court is significantly different from that of the
court that establishes a precedent. One important aspect of the functioning
of a lower court-some might say its determining perspective-is prediction of what its own superior courts are likely to do if the case comes up for
review. The division between holding and dictum for a lower court, then,
may involve a prediction of what a higher court would do. Further, a lower
court faced with dictum of a higher court that a higher court will probably
follow is likely to feel constrained to a much greater extent by that dictum
than is the higher court itself. When the lower court engages in prediction
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about what the higher court will do with the higher court's precedents, the
lower court's serious attention to the distinction between holding and
dictum depends on the distinction's making a difference to the higher court
itself.
The advice lawyers give to clients also involves prediction of what courts
will do, or would do if a case arose. The categories of holding and dictum
are, of course, not of ultimate importance for the advising lawyer. Imagine
the lawyer who says to his client, "Well, I can assure you that your situation
is squarely within the holding of an earlier case, and I can further assure
you that it will be considered to be such by the court. Unfortunately I have
a small piece of bad news to go with this highly encouraging appraisal. It is
now virtually certain that the court will overrule the earlier case." Of course,
what matters from the client's point of view is whether the case will be won;
a loss due to overruling is just as bad as a loss in which the court says the
case fails to fall within previous holdings and disavows dicta that support
the client's side. For the advising lawyer, the distinction between holding
and dictum is an intermediate step in predicting outcomes; the distinction
matters to lawyers' predictions because it matters to courts' decisions.
So far I have made an obvious point, one essentially similar to the
general criticism of the loose realist idea that law is fundamentally a matter
of prediction. The point is that "predictive" approaches, by lower courts or
lawyers, to the distinction between holding and dictum are parasitic on an
established normative assumption within our system, one accepted by
higher courts, that holdings are more authoritative, that they should be given
greater deference, than dicta.
How widely limiting are the constraints of holdings? If the amount of
genuine constraint is extremely slight and the amount of latitude for the
second court extremely great, then perhaps in the vast majority of cases
there is no genuine constraint, and all one can do before the second court
acts is to predict how far that court will say it is constrained. In that event,
my theoretical point that holdings constrain might be preserved, but, most
of the time, lawyers' talk about the holding-dictum distinction would be just
a matter of prediction. However, most judges take with some seriousness
the idea that they should follow precedents, and the effort to determine the
scope of precedents is important for them. Often it will be difficult, or
impossible, to state a single precise holding; plausible formulations may be
at higher and lower levels of generality, and there may be confusion at the
edges. But usually there will be some substantial number of subsequent
possible cases that plainly fall within the holding of an earlier case. And
many statements in opinions are clearly dicta. Though the later court's
drawing a distinction between the holding and dictum of an earlier case
inevitably involves the difficulties attendant on interpretation of texts more
generally, typically the opinion of the earlier case does set substantial
boundaries on what can plausibly be called holding and what can plausibly
be called dictum.
At its core, then, the distinction between holding and dictum is an aspect
of a practice under which what is established by a previous case is treated as
authoritative by a subsequent court. What counts as holding is what the
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earlier case establishes, and it carries very considerable authority. What
counts as dictum has much less weight. It is sometimes said that dictum has
only as much weight as the force of the reasoning behind it. This is probably
wrong as a general matter; dictum by the court usually carries a little more
weight in our system than the similar thought expressed by an obscure
scholar and brought to the court's attention. But what matters for my
inquiry is that plain dictum has much less weight than holding, not exactly
how much weight dictum has.
The justifications for the distinction are roughly as follows. Courts are
most to be trusted when they focus on particular disputes. They are aware
of the relevant facts, and the possible competing legal positions have been
argued at length by lawyers. What courts decide, therefore, is much more
reliable than their passing comments on peripherally related legal subjects.
If the authority of courts to "make law" in a society with a legislative branch
is largely a product of the necessity of courts' resolving disputes, then the
authority of a particular court should extend only to what is needed to
resolve the dispute, not further. How far this notion of the court's authority
needs to be qualified in terms of the supervisory and educational functions
of higher courts is a controversial question. Nevertheless, the basic idea of
courts as determiners of particular disputes does support the notion that
dictum should not carry too much authority.
II. The Elements of Ideal Instances and How They Relate to the
Distinction
Once we understand the logic behind the holding-dictum distinction, we
can identify the aspects of a case that are most undeniably holding or
dictum. Suppose that a point was extensively argued by counsel, is
necessary to the decision of the case, is stated by the court as its rule of law
for the case, and is indicated by an appraisal of the material facts joined to
the outcome. Such a point is clear holding. If, however, a legal point in the
opinion was not argued by counsel, had no important bearing on decision
of the case, is not covered by any stated rule of law for the case, and is
beyond any scope of the material facts of the case, the court's treatment of
the point is dictum. Let us explore the elements of these ideal instances.
A. Has the Point Been Fully Argued By Counsel and Considered By the Court?

The precise weight of earlier authority may rest to some extent on
whether the point covered was argued by counsel and carefully considered
by the court. Discussion that is evidently dictum because of the way a case
is finally resolved can have somewhat more power if it reflects extensive
argument by counsel and careful judicial consideration. An example of
such discussion occurs in Chief Judge Fuld's opinion for the New York

Court of Appeals in Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 3 a suit

claiming that in his book Papa Hemingway, A. E. Hotcher breached a
3. Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 341, 296 N.Y.S. 2d 771, 244
N.E.2d 250 (1968).
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common-law copyright in oral conversations by quoting Ernest Hemingway's remarks in private talks. The Court said a great deal to suggest that
in some cases a copyright in oral conversations might be appropriate but,
"without deciding" that issue, concluded that what Hemingway said would
not qualify because he had in no way marked it off from ordinary discourse.
Occasionally, courts decide that something is critical to resolution of a case
that lawyers either missed or chose not to raise. What would otherwise
certainly be holding is generated without the benefit of argument to the
point. Quite possibly if the subsequent court is made aware of this, it may
take a slightly more skeptical view than if the first court's action had
followed full argument. Actually, nowadays, when appellate judges have
extensive research help from law clerks, what probably matters most is
whether the court that decides the initial case evidences awareness of
relevant authority and arguments. Ascertaining whether points have been
argued by counsel is one inquiry that bears on that question; but a written
opinion may show that law clerks have filled the gap left by counsel, and if
counsel are inept, their having argued a point is not necessary assurance
that the court has had in mind all that is centrally important.
In any event, it may matter to the second court how fully the first court
has considered an issue, and how extensively counsel have argued the point
can bear on how full the consideration has been. But it is quite clear that
what counts as holding or dictum does not depend on what counsel have
done. The most fully argued points can end up being dictum, and an
unargued point can end up being holding. Although holdings are given
more weight than dicta partly because they are usually supported by full
argument and full consideration, categorization as "holding" does not
depend on full argument and full consideration.
B. Necessity to the Decision
What the court says or determines that is necessary to its decision is
holding; what it says in passing that is not required for the decision is
dictum. Although the distinction sounds simple, it requires some comment.
1. The Order in Which Issues Are Addressed
Imagine that in the course of its opinion, the court resolves an issue that
the facts of the case dearly present, but its disposition of some other issue
shows that the case would have come out the same way even if the court had
not addressed the first issue or had decided it in the opposite way. In
retrospect, we can say that the court's discussion of the first point was
unnecessary to the decision in a strict sense. Does that mean that what it
says about that issue is therefore relegated to the status of dictum? Such a
broad generalization would misstate the practice of courts.
Consider, for instance, a case in which the first court considers issues in
their "natural" order. Pauline, a taxpayer but not a parent, sues to stop a
"moment of silence" in a local public school. The school board argues, first,
that Paulihe's status as a taxpayer confers no standing to raise the claim
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because no public money is expended for a moment of silence, and, second,
that a moment of silence is permissible under state and federal constitutions. The highest state court resolves that Pauline does have standing but
that the argument on the merits in favor of a moment of silence is correct.
The case would have come out the same way-that is, Pauline would have
lost-if the court had simply assumed standing without deciding the
question and proceeded directly to the merits. Normal judicial practice,
however, is to take threshold issues of jurisdiction, standing, and procedure
first, before considering the merits. The court followed normal practice
when it resolved the standing question before proceeding to the underlying
constitutional issue. What it determined about standing is usually considered holding even though it may turn out to be unnecessary to the decision.
We reach somewhat murlder waters when the court's choice of order for
issues is not dictated by normal practice, or is even contrary to that practice,
or when the court offers two alternative grounds of decision each of which
alone would be sufficient. The issues in the Hemingway case present the first
situation. To win, Hemingway's estate and widow needed to establish that
there was such a thing as a common-law copyright in oral conversations and
that Hemingway's conversations with Hotchner satisfied the conditions for
such a copyright. Random House could win either if there was no
common-law copyright in oral conversations or if the conditions for such a
copyright were not satisfied. As I have indicated, what the court did was to
suggest at some length, but without deciding, that there could be a
common-law copyright; it decided that Hemingway's failure to try to mark
off the conversations disqualified them for any right that might exist. For
the two substantive issues, no natural order of determination is apparent.
Rather than approaching the issues as did the Court of Appeals, a court
might simply have said that the Hemingway conversations would not
qualify even if a common-law copyright were to exist, without discussing
whether it did exist; or a court might have set as the first question whether
there was any common-law copyright in oral conversations and, after
resolving that question in favor of copyright, might then have determined
whether the conditions for copyright were satisfied. Suppose that a court
had taken the last approach and agreed with the Court of Appeals that the
conditions were not satisfied? Would all the court had said positively about
the existence of common-law copyright be mere dictum? Second courts
probably assume that the first court can set its agenda for considering issues
with considerable flexibility. If issues are resolved in some logical progression, the court's resolution of an early issue is not considered mere dictum
because resolution of a later issue shows that the outcome of the case would
have been the same even if the first issue had been resolved differently. The
authority that attaches to resolution of the first issue may, however, be
somewhat less than if its resolution were essential to disposition of the case
or its initial resolution were dictated not by the individual court's choice but
by a "natural" order of consideration, as in the "standing" example. If a
court has not only made a choice about order but has obviously reversed the
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natural order of considering issues, its disposition of a first issue may have
even less authority; a later court may decide that the earlier court reached
out inappropriately.
Sometimes courts provide parallel reasons for deciding against a party,
saying, for example, that A's claim for recovery against B is barred by two
separate statutes. What is the status of the "alternative holdings"? Because
the decision would be the same if either were eliminated, it might be said
that neither is necessary to the decision. I do not think courts typically treat
alternative holdings as dictum, though perhaps the authority of an alternative holding is less forceful than the authority of a single holding.
2. The Filling Between Holding and Dictum
The issue of holding or dictum is usually raised in connection with a
court's indication of how a particular legal problem should be handled. Is
there a common-law copyright for oral conversations? Is the estate of ajoint
subscriber to a charity liable to other joint subscribers? Judicial opinions
commonly contain not only comments on such points but indications of
interpretive strategies and broad reasons that bear on particular problems.
A court might say, for example, that the critical question in constitutional
interpretation is the intent of the framers, or that people are ordinarily
entitled to the fruits of their labors. What can be said about such comments?
Sometimes they are essential to the decision that the court finally reaches.
Were the court to have taken a different plausible position on constitutional
interpretation or were it not to have thought the right to frits of labor
relevant, the decision might have come out the other way. In truth, it is
usually extremely difficult to know how crucial such stated positions are,
because one cannot often be sure how the court would have resolved the
case had it gone on a different tack. Although a court's general observations
do not fall within the doctrine of precedent and bind its successors, the
underlying premises of the court's more particular reasoning hardly seem
mere dictum. When the kind of general considerations I have mentioned
play a prominent role in the resolution of a particular legal issue, they
hardly fit comfortably into the holding-dictum dichotomy at all.
C. Rule of Law or MaterialFactsJoined to Outcome
So far I have assumed that what the first court does with a case, beyond
its simple decision one way or the other, has something to do with the
holding of the case. I shall defend that assumption in the next section, but
first I want to focus on a puzzle: Which is more important, the rule of law

that the court's opinion announces, or the court's determinations about
material facts in a case joined to its outcome? When the court indicates the
circumstances in which a manufacturer will be liable to a remote user in
negligence, it is stating a rule of law. When the court indicates which facts
of the case are critical, it reveals its view about material facts.
As long as one focuses exclusively on the first court, whether the holding
rests on announced rule of law or on material facts and outcome is of minor
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significance, because application of the two criteria usually has the same
practical effect. I shall illustrate the point in connection with the piquant
old case of Barholt v. Wright,4 after indicating a few assumptions and
simplifications.
Two people agree to an ordinary fight. In the course of the fight,
Barholt bites off a finger of Wright's (in the actual case he only injured the
finger so badly it had to be amputated). Wright sues for damages on a
theory that Barholt has committed a civil battery. We can imagine three
possible legal theories on which Wright might recover: (1)consent to a fight
is not ever a bar to recovery for injuries suffered because fights are against
public policy5 ; (2) consent to an ordinary fight does not reach severe biting,
so that Wright's consent to an ordinary fight does not cover injuries caused
by tactics clearly in excess of those contemplated; (3) whatever may be the
case for ordinary tactics and ordinary injuries, consent is ineffective in
respect to tactics and injuries as serious as the biting off of fingers. 6
Suppose that the court's stated view is that consent to a fight is irrelevant
to recovery, whatever the tactics and scope of injuries. The excessiveness of
Barholt's tactics would not matter to the theory of recovery, nor would
Wright's consent to an ordinary fight or his failure to consent to a fight with
vicious bites. For recovery these matters are not material facts (i.e., the
result would be the same regardless of Wright's consent and its limits, and
regardless of Barholt's tactics). Thus, in a coherent judicial opinion the
critical material facts would be plaintiff's suffering of injury from an
intentional act of aggression by defendant in a fight, leading to an outcome
of recovery; and the stated rule of law would be that one who commits an
intentional act of aggression in a fight is liable for injuries caused.7 If the
court regarded as legally relevant the excessiveness of the tactics, the
consent to an ordinary fight, or the failure to consent to excessive tactics,
both the court's view of the material facts and its sense of the applicable rule
of law would be different. In any opinion that carefully tailors the rule of
law to the material facts, the ambit of the rule of law will conform to the
ambit of the material facts and outcome.
In reality, ascertaining clearly either the rule of law or the court's view of
the material facts is sometimes difficult. Often figuring out the appropriate
level of generality at which to state the material facts or principle of law can
be a problem. On occasion, the opinion will not indicate sharply whether
4. Barholt v. Wright, 45 Ohio St. 177, 12 N.E. 185 (1887).
5. I disregard two ways in which consent might matter even if this basic theory were
adopted. The first, clearly accepted by the court in the actual Barliolt case, is that consent
bears on damages, presumably because a blow is "less offensive" if agreed to. The second
is that consent might bear on what would or would not count as self-defensive action.
6. Strictly, the tactics used are distinguishable from the injury caused. Excessive tactics
might produce only ordinary injuries, and ordinary tactics-e.g., a blow to the
jaw-might produce very serious injuries that are not wholly unforeseeable-e.g., the
person hit falls against a sharp edge and fractures his skull. Although the logic of a rule
that makes consent ineffective beyond a certain point would probably focus on excessive
tactics rather than actual seriousness of injury, for the purposes of this discussion I shall
simply refer to excessive tactics and injuries together and assume that, as in Barholt, they
are joined.
7. I am not trying to sum up the civil law of battery in any jurisdiction; rather, I am using
the illustration only to clarify the theoretical point.
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some possibly important fact is critical. In Barholt v. Wright, for example,
passages in the opinion and at least one citation seem to suggest that
consent to a fight is never effective, while other passages lay emphasis on
the severity of the tactics and injury. Extracting either a single rule of law or
a single view of the material facts is therefore difficult. In cases of
uncertainty, one would ordinarily use what the court says about material
facts to understand its rule of law and what it says about its rule of law to
understand its view of the material facts.8
There can, however, be a clear disjunction-what the court says about
material facts will simply not fit with the rule of law it purports to employ.
What counts as the holding in that event? If the views of the first court
matter to the second court, as I have so far assumed, we can imagine that
the second court will try to ascertain which aspect of the opinion engaged
the first court's most careful judgment. Usually one would place more
confidence in the court's view of the material facts, because the facts have
been sharply presented to it and imprecision in abstract generalization is a
common human failing; but in cases in which the court worries much more
about an applicable rule of law than the facts of the particular case, the
stated rule of law may appear a more reliable indication of its considered
judgment. If, as I believe is probable, second courts take into account and
do not relegate to dictum both a first court's view of the material facts and
its stated rule of law, and if they do not have some automatic practice to
disregard one or the other in cases of a divergence, then we should hesitate
to identify the holding exclusively either with the stated rule of law or with
the material facts joined to outcome.
As I have said, in cases of divergence between material facts and the
stated rule of law, the barometer of material facts is usually a more reliable
indication of what matters to the first court. Further, a focus on material
facts most pointedly raises the issue of the respective authority of the first
and second courts. I shall proceed therefore in the rest of the discussion by
supposing that the holding can be reduced to a formulation concerning the
material facts and outcome.
D. The First Court and Subsequent Courts-Who Determines the Holding?
In approaching the general question of which court determines a
holding, we must be careful not to confuse separate inquiries. If what the
first court regards as critical is unclear, then inevitably much is left to the
second court. It may itself recognize the indeterminateness of the first
court's disposition, either candidly acknowledging it in its own opinion or
not so candidly "interpreting" the first court's disposition to support its own
perception of a sound approach. Even if the second court conscientiously
8. I pass over the subtle distinction between accepting a view that appears best supported
by the text of the opinion and accepting a view that appears best to capture the actual
intentions of the judges joining the opinion. For determining intention, materials such
as a judge's speeches off the bench might be relevant in a way they would not be for a
"literal" reading. This difference in how to define the views in the earlier case represents
one manifestation of the general question of how "intentionalist" legal interpretation
should be.
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attempts to ascertain what the first court was about, its own view of what
would be sound is bound to influence its sense of what the first court did,
so long as the first court was not relevantly clear.
I want to put the common situation of an unclear first court's opinion to
the side and to address circumstances in which what the first court thought
is relevantly clear.9 We need first to face the substantive question of what
carries authority for the second court, and then to inquire what conceptual
terminology best reflects that understanding.
Let us suppose that in a case after Barholt, two persons have clearly
agreed to a fight that includes such tactics as gouging and severe biting, and
that plaintiffs finger has been bitten off. Let us also suppose that on the
facts of Barholt itself consent to fight clearly did not encompass such
tactics,' 0 and that the opinion in Barholt makes evident that consent to such
tactics would not bar recovery for battery." 1 The second court is inclined to
the view that the most sound legal approach would be to bar civil recovery
for injuries inflicted in a manner freely consented to; 12 but it asks itself
whether Barholt is a serious impediment to its deciding in this way.
Had Barholt itself involved consent to severe biting, then an undoubted
holding would stand in the way of the second court's inclination. Then, both
the Barholt court's view of the material facts and the second court's view of
the material facts would not distinguish Barholt from the second case. The
new principle of "no recovery for tactics consented to" could be established
only if Barholt were explicitly or implicitly overruled. (I count a court's
saying "we disapprove of the reasoning of Barholt and limit the result to its
precise facts" as an implicit overruling.)
Our -hypothetical situation is different because biting tactics were consented to in the second case, but not in Barholt. From the second court's
point of view, an important difference exists in what ideally would be
understood as material facts of the two cases; but the Barholt court did not
suppose there was such a difference, because it thought consent to severe
tactics was legally irrelevant. For the second court, there are three possible
assessments of the authority of what the Barholt court supposed.
The first possibility is that all that matters is the second court's view of
possible material facts. All it needs to consider is the outcome and its own
view of the material facts of the first case and the material facts of the
second case. The result in Barholt then poses no problem because it is
perfectly consonant with the second court's view of the soundest legal
principle, and a crucial difference in material facts exists between the two
cases. Any contrary indications in Barholt itself will be viewed as mere
9. The word "relevantly" is important in the text. There is no sharp division between
opinions that state clear holdings and those that state indecipherable ones. Clarity must
bejudged in respect to the subsequent case. If one looks at case A, it may have a holding
that plainly extends to the facts of case B but whose import for the facts of case C is
unclear.
10. Given the procedural posture in Barholt, this formulation seems highly probable for the
actual case but not certain.
11. That is how I read the actual opinion.
12. This approach would leave to the criminal law any response to persons who agree to
fight in a way contrary to public policy and who do not exceed the agreed-upon tactics.
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dictum, and what the Barholt court said about material facts and applicable
rule of law carries no greater weight than what is indisputably dictum.
I am reasonably confident that this is not the typical approach of second
courts. Rather, the first court's view of the material facts and rule of law
does count for something. In Silver v. Great American Insurance Co.,1 for
example, the New York Court of Appeals, considering whether dismissal
for forum non conveniens should be granted to a defendant that is a New
York corporation, assumed that earlier cases stood for the proposition that
forum non conveniens should never be granted when either party is a state
resident. That is the view reflected in at least two of the earlier cases; yet the
degree of need for a different forum will vary for dissimilar cases. Why did
the Silver court not ask if the practical need for suit in another jurisdiction
in the earlier cases was as great as the need in Silver? If the need was
markedly less, the cases could have been plausibly distinguished on their
facts from Silver; and if all that counts is the second court's view of the
various material facts, then no overruling of the earlier cases would have
been required. The court, however, took the rule stated in the earlier cases
on its face and did not bother to inquire what the result in those cases would
have been under the new, more flexible rule it announced. I believe, as
Silver shows in one instance, that second courts typically take rather
seriously what first courts think about material facts and applicable rules
when the first court's thoughts are clear.
A second possible approach is that the second court attempts an honest
appraisal of the first court's view of the material facts and the outcome, and
that the first court's views are taken as controlling by the second court.
Under this approach, how much force the second court would give to the
first court's disposition would depend on how it thinks the first court
conceived the material facts rather than on the second court's own view of
the respective material facts. This account of the authority of the first case
is also probably erroneous. Instead, a second court will be more hesitant to
deviate from the reasoning of the first court if the second court perceives no
difference in the material facts of the two cases than if it perceives a
difference. The court considering consent to biting would be more reluctant to impose a new rule that consent to tactics always bars recovery if that
rule is plainly at odds with the Barholt outcome as well as with the views of
the Barholt court. In other words, the authority of what the Barholt court
said about material facts and rule of law is somewhat diminished if the second
court can find a plausible distinction in the material facts as it sees them.
If I am right so far, a third possibility reflects actual practice. Both the
first court's and second court's views of the respective material facts count
significantly for the second court. A second court will be somewhat hesitant
to decide differently a case dearly covered by the material facts as the first
court undoubtedly perceived them; a second court will be even more
hesitant to decide differently a case whose material facts, as it sees them, are
not distinguishable from those of the earlier case.
13. 29 N.Y. 2d 356, 328 N.Y.S.2d 398, 278 N.E.2d 619 (1972).
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A subsidiary problem of conceptual terminology remains. Although I
am inclined to say that, after a case is decided, its holding is determined by
the court's view of the material facts and applicable rule of law, as far as
these are clear, I would recognize that the authority of the case will be
greatest for fact situations that cannot plausibly be distinguished from the
facts of the first case. Thus, although the holding of Barholt indicates that
plaintiffs can recover for injuries caused by excessive tactics regardless of
consent, the holding carries less weight (through much more weight than
dictum) when applied to a subsequent instance of actual consent than
would a similar holding for a case in which actual consent to excessive
tactics had been present.
Once the second court has interpreted the first case, no single answer
can be given to questions about the holding of the first case. If someone
asks about its holding, he or she may be interested in what has survived
subsequent cases or in what the first court really was getting at. Only when
14
the context of the question is clear can a definitive answer be given.
Finally, how do we describe the situation in which the second court
disavows the reasoning of the first court, but its own theory establishes that
the result of the first case was plainly correct?-i.e., if the Barholt court
thought consent to excessive tactics was legally irrelevant, but the subsequent court decided consent was critical, and in Barholt consent had been
absent. The second court's view of material facts would yield the actual
result in Barholt. In this case, the best phraseology for what is happening is
tricky. Without much confidence, I would be inclined not to speak of
overruling but to say something like, "The second court disavowed the
central basis for decision of Barholt, but its own standards of material facts
and its rule of law would leave standing the results in cases such as Barholt
in which consent to severe tactics is not present." I would limit the term
"overruling" to situations in which the new principles show that the earlier
result was mistaken or leave the status of the earlier result unclear (we do
not know how the decision about forum non conveniens would have come
out in the earlier cases if the flexible standard of Silver had been applied).' 5
III. Conclusion

My suggestions indicate that simple dichotomies such as holding-dictum
and overruling-distinguishing do not adequately capture our complex
practices. Lawyers who want to use concepts in a way that will persuade may
not need to worry too much about these subtleties, but for scholars who
seek to illuminate what the practices are really like finding an appropriate
terminology is difficult. Although my treatment has been summary and
relatively superficial, it does reveal that many different issues are packed
into the distinction between holding and dictum, and that arriving at a
satisfactory conceptual vocabulary that fairly reflects the authoritative
weight for later courts of what earlier courts have done is no simple matter.
14. Insofar as the opinions are unclear, no definitive answers may be forthcoming even
then.

15. This situation will be fairly common. Because by present lights the earlier court did not
apply the right standards or ask the right questions, what would have happened had it
done so will often be shrouded in uncertainty.

